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WHAT A LONG STRANGE TRIP IT'S BEEN:
COURT-CREATED LIMITATIONS ON RIGHTS OF
ACTION FOR NEGLIGENTLY FURNISHING ALCOHOL
Sheldon H. Jaffe
Abstract: Under the traditional view of the common law, drinking alcohol rather than
providing alcohol acted as the proximate cause of any resulting harm, and therefore
furmishers of alcohol had no duty to the people served or those injured by the persons served.
The Washington Supreme Court has held that negligently furnishing alcohol can be a
proximate cause in tort but has severely limited rights of action: vendors who serve minors
or obviously intoxicated adults may be sued by subsequently injured innocent third parties,
and all people who serve alcohol to minors may face suit if the minor is subsequently injured
because of drinking. The court, however, has held that, except for the duty owed to minors
who injure themselves, there is no social host liability in Washington. In addition vendors,
like social hosts, are immune from suit by adults who injure themselves. This Comment
contends that these distinctions and limitations are neither inherently logical nor mandated
by legislative action. It argues that liability should be uniform for all classes of potential
plaintiffs and potential defendants, and that questions of contributory negligence and
foreseeability of harm are properly delegated to the trier of fact.
The inn that shelters for the night is not the journey's end. The law,
like the traveler, must be ready for the morrow. It must have a
principle of growth.t
Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo
The Washington Supreme Court never has been a shrinking violet when
it has come to finding rights of action within tort law. If anything, the
opposite is the case.2 Historical interpretations of the common law, and
even legislative command, have been swept aside by the court acting in its
role as the protector of nonstatutory rights.
In determining the scope of duty owed by furnishers of alcohol, the
court has likewise moved beyond traditional restrictions, modifying the
historical common law rule under which it was not a tort either to sell or
1. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Growth ofthe Law 20 (1924).
2. See Cornelius J. Peck, Constitutional Challenges to the Partial Rejection and Modification of
the Common Law Rule of Joint and Several Liability Made by the 1986 Washington Tort Reform
Act, 62 Wash. L. Rev. 681, 681 n.2 (1987) ("The Washington Supreme Court has played a leading
role in developing tort law."); see also Burkhart v. Harrod, 110 Wash. 2d 381, 394 n.6, 755 P.2d
759, 765 n.l (1988) (Utter, J., concurring) ("When over-arching principles of justice are not
accommodated by traditional theories of tort recovery, we do not hesitate to take measured steps to
advance more just theories... ").
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give intoxicating liquor.3 In Washington, commercial hosts and vendors4
who serve either a minor or an obviously intoxicated adult may be liable
to innocent third parties who are injured as a result of -this ' negligent"
service. In addition, both commercial and social hosts owe a duty of care
to minors whose drinking may result in injury to themselves. The court
so far has denied a right of action to any other persons injured as a result
of negligently furnishing alcohol. For example, a third party injured by a
drunk driver who became intoxicated at a friend's house may not sue the
social host. Nor may adult bar patrons who injure themselves as a result
of their drinking bring suit against the bar. This is true regardless of the
level of egregiousness of the vendor or the social host's negligence.5 As
a result of a confusing assortment of holdings, lower courts have been
unclear as to exactly what the rules are for both social hosts and
vendors.6
In November 1996, the Washington Supreme Court heard oral
argument in three cases that raise further questions about liability for
negligent service of alcohol.7 Decisions in these cases were pending as
3. See 45 Am. Jur. 2d Intoxicating Liquors § 553 (1969); see also Halvorson v. Birchfield
Boiler, 76 Wash. 2d 759, 762, 458 P.2d 897, 899 (1969) (accepting comparable definition as
existing common law standard for Washington). But see Purchase v. Meyer. 108 Wash. 2d 220,
225, 737 P.2d 661, 664 (1987) (citing Halvorson, oldest among list of cases, for proposition that "it
has long been the common law of this state that a commercial purveyor of alcohol ... may be held
liable for damages caused by furnishing intoxicating beverages to an 'obviously intoxicated'
person" (citations omitted)).
4. Commercial hosts and vendors, who have the same liability, are those people who furnish
alcohol as part of business undertakings, such as bars, liquor stores, and food stores that sell beer
and wine. The court also recognizes the "quasi-commercial" host whose potential liability is the
same as a commercial host. See infra notes 52-62 and accompanying text.
5. Negligence is not used here to mean a legal duty, as the court has held that such a duty does
not exist in these instances. See infra Part I.A. Rather, it is used in the spirit of the Restatement of
Torts: providing alcohol to someone who is likely to use it in a manner involving unreasonable
risk. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390 (1965). The case law, as does this Comment,
generally considers service, negligent in this sense of the word when the alcohol is given to a minor
or a person "obviously intoxicated." A more detailed analysis of the applicability of section 390 is
provided infra Part Il.D.2.
6. As one practitioner has noted:
mhe scope of duty owed by providers of alcohol is one in which [the Washington Supreme]
court has drawn increasingly fine distinctions ... [which] create an unusual amount of
uncertainty about the court's ruling[s]... in this area and... a greater degree of inconsistency
and unpredictability in the rulings of the lower courts.
Amicus Curiae Memorandum in Support of Petition for Review at 4, Scho3ley v. Pinch's Deli
Mkt., Inc., 80 Wash. App. 862, 912 P.2d 1044, review granted, 129 Wash. 2d 1025, 922 P.2d 98
(1996) (No. 3-64023-8).
7. Schooley v. Pinch's Deli Market, Inc., argued November 19, 1996, seeks to determine if a
vendor who sold alcohol to minor A can be sued by another minor with whom A shares the liquor.
See Washington State Courts, Supreme Court Calendar for November 19. 1996 (last modified Jan.
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this Comment went to press, but it is unlikely that the court will use
them as an opportunity to provide the major changes the law requires!
Further refinements may answer specific questions, but new
permutations will likely arise, each requiring the court to decide the rule
of law for that fact pattern.
The illogic and inconsistency that is at the heart of the court's
holdings in the area of tort liability for funishers of alcohol will not be
dissipated by increased refinement. The severe restrictions the court has
placed on actions for negligently furnishing alcohol flow neither from
the logic of the court's earlier holdings nor from legislative mandate. In
determining that there is no social host liability, the court has decided
that social hosts can never reasonably foresee the outcome of their
service of alcohol as a matter of law, when the question of foreseeability
is one of fact that should be determined in each case. By holding that
adults who injure themselves can never bring suit against those who
have negligently provided them with liquor, the court has reinstated the
strict bar of contributory negligence, despite the existence of a
legislatively-created system of comparative fault.
This Comment argues that the court should eliminate the illogical
distinctions it has drawn, and instead engender a uniform standard of
liability for all furnishers of alcohol, whether commercial or social.
Every person should be expected to behave in a reasonable manner so as
to avoid foreseeable harms. Similarly, everyone should have an
opportunity to establish that a tortfeasor's actions were unreasonable,
even if the injured party has contributed to the harm. Part I reviews the
current status of civil liability for negligently furnishing alcohol and the
holdings that established this status. Part II discusses how a court can
properly guarantee individual rights of action while still considering
inconsistent holdings, apparent legislative inaction, and conflicting
9, 1997) <http:lwww.wa.gov/courts/crtinfo/supreme/calendarll1-19.htm>. Crowe v. Gaston (No.
4-64311-3) looks for an answer to the question of both minor A's and vendor's liability to an
injured third party. Id. Reynolds v. Hicks (No. 1-64632-5) raises the issue of social hosts' liability
when a minor they serve injures a third party. See Washington State Courts, Supreme Court
Calendar for November 20, 1996 (last modified Jan. 9, 1997)
<http://www.wa.govlcourts/crtinfo/supreme/ calendar/I 1-20.htm>.
8. Moreover, the questions presented by these cases merely revolve around fine tuning the exact
duty owed to minors served alcohol and any third parties they injure. Because this Comment argues
that all adults owe a duty of reasonable care to all other adults, the outcome of these cases is
unlikely to affect its analysis. Therefore, this Comment does not speculate on potential holdings in
these cases. Nor does this Comment incorporate any refinements that have been set by lower courts
but not yet accepted by the Washington Supreme Court. See, e.g., Schooley, 80 Wash. App. at 877,
912 P.2d at 1052 (holding that vendors who sell alcohol to minor may be liable to second minor
who subsequently drinks liquor).
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interpretations of the common law. Part I examines the rationales
offered by the court for its limitations on liability for funishers of
alcohol. Finally, this Comment argues that the court should return
determinations of foreseeability and comparative negligence to the
finder of fact.
I. THE ROAD TO HOST LIABILITY: WHO CAN SUE WHOM?
A. Current Status of the Law in Washington
In Washington, all who furnish alcohol have at least some legal duty
to others. The duty varies depending upon whether the furnisher is a
"commercial establishment" that sells alcohol or a purely social host.9
Commercial vendors have a duty not to provide minors with alcohol,
and they may be sued 0 by a third party" or by the injuxed minor12 for
injuries resulting from the minor's intoxication. In addition, innocent
third parties may bring a negligence action against a commercial vendor
for serving an obviously intoxicated adult. 3 Commercial hosts, however,
are not legally liable for an intoxicated adult patron's self-inflicted
injuries. 4 A social host is not liable for accidents that result from a
guest's intoxication,15 but social hosts are potentially liable to minors
who injure themselves.' 6
The court has effectively granted one class of potential defendants
immunity and has denied recovery to another. The limitations on
liability imposed by the court flow neither from the logic of the court's
earlier holdings nor legislative mandate. In finding faat adults who
injure themselves can never bring suit against those who have
negligently provided them with liquor, the court has installed a system
of contributory negligence in place of the legislatively-mandated system
of comparative fault. By holding social hosts free of liability except
when serving minors who injure themselves, the coit has made an
9. See Kelly v. Falin, 127 Wash. 2d 31, 33, 896 P.2d 1245, 1246 (1995).
10. Id. at 37, 896 P.2d at 1247.
11. See Purchase v. Meyer, 108 Wash. 2d 220,228, 737 P.2d 661, 666 (1987).
12. See Young v. Caravan Corp., 99 Wash. 2d 655, 660, 663 P.2d 834, 837 (1983).
13. See Kelly, 127 Wash. 2d at 37, 896 P.2d at 1247.
14. Id. at 39-40, 896 P.2d at 1249.
15. See Burkhart v. Harrod, 110 Wash. 2d 381, 383, 755 P.2d 759, 760 (1988) ("[Tjhere is no
social host liability in this state.").
16. See Hansen v. Friend, 118 Wash. 2d 476, 485, 824 P.2d 483, 488 (1992). The question of
whether a social host may be sued by an innocent third party who is injured by a minor served by
the social host is among the cases now before the Washington Supreme Court. See supra note 7.
Vol. 72:595, 1997
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unwise and expansive decision on foreseeability, a question best left to
the trier of fact.
B. The Dramshop Act
Prior to 1955, Washington's Dramshop Act governed the duty owed
by a furnisher of alcohol." The Act allowed anyone injured, in person or
property, by an intoxicated person to sue anyone who by selling or
giving alcohol caused the intoxication. 8 Comparable Dramshop Acts
governed liability in many other states.' 9
The Dramshop Act was enacted in 1881,20 eight years before
Washington became a state.' The Act remained in force until its 1955
repeal.' The Washington Supreme Court has cited this repeal as
indicative of the Legislature's disapproval of social host liability,23 but
most states repealed their Dramshop Acts in the years following the end
of prohibition.24 Despite its seemingly limitless liability, only four
published decisions regarding furnisher liability cite the Dramshop Act,
all before 1917, and all dealing with commercial vendors.25 It was not
until 1955 that the Washington Supreme Court faced the issue of
whether the Dramshop Act covered gifts, as opposed to sales, of liquor,26
but in light of the Act's repeal, the court held that the case was moot.27
17. See Christen v. Lee, 113 Wash. 2d 479, 493, 780 P.2d 1307, 1313 (1989).
18. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 4.24.100 (West 1962) (repealed 1955).
19. See John R. Ashmead, Comment, Putting a Cork on Social Host Liability: New York Rejects
a Trend, 55 Brook. L. Rev. 995, 998 (1989).
20. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 4.24.100 (West 1962) (repealed 1955).
21. 12 The New Encyclopedia Britanica 508 (15th ed. 1989).
22 Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 4.24.100 (West 1962) (repealed 1955).
23. See Burkhart v. Harrod, 110 Wash. 2d 381, 387-88, 755 P.2d 759, 762 (1988).
24. See Shelli Inmon, Comment, Tomlinson v. Love's Country Stores, Inc.: What Did the Court
Really Do?, 19 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 533, 536 (1994).
25. See Norlund v. Pearson, 91 Wash. 358, 157 P. 875 (1916); Woodring v. Jacobino, 54 Wash.
504, 103 P. 809 (1909); Judson v. Pary, 38 Wash. 37, 80 P. 194 (1905); Delfel v. Hanson, 2 Wash.
194, 26 P. 220 (1891).
26. See Hansen v. \Vest Coast Wholesale Drug Co., 47 Wash. 2d 825, 826, 289 P.2d 718, 719
(1955).
27. Id. at 827, 289 P.2d at 720.
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C. The Washington Supreme Court's Holdings Since the Dramshop
Act's Repeal
1. Duty when Serving-the Beginning
In 1969 the court decided Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler, 28 holding
that a company hosting a Christmas party could not be liable for an
accident caused by a homebound employee who allegedly got drunk at
the event.29 The court based its decision on a finding tha, in the absence
of the now-repealed Dramshop Act, liability for those who furnish
alcohol must be based on a "theory" of common law negligence. 0 The
court, relying upon out-of-state precedents and the American
Jurisprudence, 3' found no host liability to innocent third parties,
adopting the traditional view of the common law that the act of selling
alcohol can never be a proximate cause of any harm that might arise
from drinking it.32 The court noted that the same rationale applied to the
"donor who gives intoxicating liquor,"'33 while also indicating a
willingness to find some liability for vendors.34 In this case, the court
held that the defendant company could in no way be a vendor 5 and
deferred to the Legislature the "policy decision" of liability for
negligently furnishing alcohol.36
2. Duty when Serving the Obviously Intoxicated
The 1975 case, Shelby v. Keck,37 involved an intoxicated bar patron,
Keck, who accidentally shot and killed another customer.38 The court
found that Keck was not "obviously intoxicated ' 39 and, therefore, upheld a
directed verdict for the vendor without deciding the question of
28. 76 Wash. 2d 759,458 P.2d 897 (1969).
29. Id. at 759-60, 765,458 P.2d at 897-98, 900.
30. Id at 762, 458 P.2d at 899.
31. Id. at 762-65, 458 P.2d at 899-900.
32. a at 762,458 P.2d at 899.
33. Id. at 762-63,458 P.2d at 899.
34. Id. at 764,458 P.2d at 900 (noting aptly recognized difference between commercial vending
of intoxicants and social or quasi-social furnishing of liquor).
35. Id. at 765,458 P.2d at 900.
36. Id.
37. 85 Wash. 2d 911, 541 P.2d 365 (1975).
38. Id. at 912, 541 P.2d at 367.
39. In Washington, obvious intoxication is proven not by a blood alcohol test, but by a person's
appearance. See, e.g., id. at 915, 541 P.2d at 369.
Vol. 72:595, 1997
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commercial host liability when serving someone obviously intoxicated.4"
The court indicated in dicta, however, that one theory of the common law
would allow suit where liquor was sold to a person so intoxicated as to be
effectively deprived of willpower.4
Despite a lack of any holding on the subject of commercial host
liability, the court accepted the potential for this liability as established
in two cases decided in the early 1980s. In Young v. Caravan Corp.42 the
court reversed a summary judgment because sufficient facts existed to
present a question as to the decedent's sobriety.43 In Wilson v.
Steinbach44 the court held that the hosts were not liable to an intoxicated
minor who subsequently died in a driving accident because insufficient
evidence existed to show that the decedent had been obviously
intoxicated at the time of service.45 Wilson involved a social
engagement;46 Young dealt with a minor served at a bar.47 In both cases
the court, almost in passing, referenced Halvorson for the proposition
that potential liability exists when a commercial host serves someone
obviously intoxicated.48 In 1987, the court again cited Halvorson for the
proposition that "it has long been the common law of this state" that
vendors may be liable for damages caused by furnishing alcohol to the
obviously intoxicated.49 Yet this is not what the Halvorson court said,50
as the court has acknowledged in other cases.5' The traditional common
law view had been changed by the court with neither legislative action
nor a word of explanation. Thus, in the 1986 case of Dickinson v.
40. Id. at 917, 541 P.2d at 370.
41. Id. at 916, 541 P.2d at 369.
42. 99 Wash. 2d 655, 663 P.2d 834 (1983). Although the basis for the holding in this case has
been superseded technically by statute, the Washington Supreme Court continues to cite Young.
This is discussed in more detail infra notes 78-93 and accompanying text.
43. Id at 659, 663 P.2d at 837.
44. 98 Wash. 2d 434, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982).
45. Id at 438, 656 P.2d at 1032.
46. Wilson, 98 Wash. 2d at 436,656 P.2d at 1031.
47. Young, 99 Wash. 2d at 657, 663 P.2d at 835-36.
48. Young, 99 Wash. 2d. at 658, 663 P.2d at 836; Wilson, 98 Wash. 2d at 438, 656 P.2d at 1032.
49. Purchase v. Meyer, 108 Wash. 2d 220, 225, 737 P.2d 661, 664 (1987).
50. Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 76 Wash. 2d 759, 764, 458 P.2d 897, 900 (1969)
(finding that vendor liability was something court "need not consider").
51. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Edwards, 105 Wash. 2d 457, 461, 716 P.2d 814, 816 (1986) ("In
Halvorson, the court recognized that some exceptions... might exist .... ); Shelby v. Keck, 85
Wash. 2d 911, 916, 541 P.2d 365, 369 (1975) (citing Halvorson for proposition that there is no
right of action in consequence of sale or gift of intoxicating liquor); see also Halligan v. Pupo, 37
Wash. App. 84, 89, 678 P.2d 1295, 1298 (1984) (arguing that Wilson and Young courts have
changed Halvorson "sub silentio").
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Edwards2 the court acknowledges that Halvorson did not establish an
exception to the traditional common law rule of vendor immunity,'
while citing Young and Wilson as establishing such a rule.54 Yet Young
and Wilson relied on Halvorson.
In Dickinson the court defined a new class of potential defendants: the
"quasi-commercial" host who served someone obviously intoxicated."
Although the facts-an employee who had allegedly gotten drunk at a
company-sponsored banquet at a hotel and injured a third party on his
way to work56 -seem nearly identical to Halvorson, the court remanded
this case to find out if the employer fit into their new category,57 a
holding that raised at least one pair of judicial eyebrows.58
Liability, the court held, accrues to those hosts who furnish alcohol
and have the "authority to deny further service" of alcohol.59 The court
added that its opinion did not even offer a "comment" on the potential
liability of social hosts.' The illogic of using this definition while at the
same time excluding social hosts is pointed out in a strong dissent."
Moreover, both the standard and legal dictionary definitions of "furnish,"
which include giving, support this point.62
Two years after Dickinson, the court held that there was no social host
liability for serving someone obviously intoxicated,63 finding that such a
52. 105 Wash. 2d at 461,716 P.2d at 816 (1986).
53. Id. at 461, 716 P.2d at 816 ("In Halvorson, the court recognized that some exceptions...
might exist .....
54. Id.
55. Id. at 466, 716 P.2d at 819.
56. Id. at 459-60, 716 P.2d at 815-16
57. Id. at 466, 716 P.2dat 819.
58. Id. at 488, 716 P.2d at 830 (Durham, J., dissenting) ("[The employer's] role as a gratuitous
fumisher of alcohol is indistinguishable from the employer's role in Halvorson.).
59. Id. at 466, 716 P.2d at 819. The question of whether the employer here fits the court's new
definition was remanded. Id. at 470, 716 P.2d at 821.
60. Id. at 466, 716 P.2d at 819.
61. Id. at 489, 716 P.2d at 830 (Durham, J., dissenting) ("[T]he inevizable extension of the
majority rationale dictates a finding of liability for a social host.").
62. Black's Law Dictionary 675 (6th ed. 1990) ("As used in the liquor laws, 'furnish' means to
provide in any way, and includes giving as well as selling."); Webster's New Universal
Unabridged Dictionary 743 (2d ed. 1983) ("Furnish ... to supply; to provide; to give.").
63. See Burkhart v. Harrod, 110 Wash. 2d 381, 383, 755 P.2d 759, 760 ('988). Justice Durham,
whose dissent in Dickinson read that case to "dictate" social host liability, wrote the majority
opinion in Burkhart. Although Burkhart involved an intoxicated person who killed himself, id., the
court has read "no social host liability" to mean just that, at least when dealing with adults. See,
e.g., Hansen v. Friend, 118 Wash. 2d 476, 482, 824 P.2d 483, 486 (1992) ("In Burkhart, this court
held that social hosts who served liquor to an adult guest could not be sued for injuries resulting
from the guest's intoxication.... [The] court reasoned that the only indication of legislative intent
Vol. 72:595, 1997
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change in the law should come from the Legislature.' The opinion did
not answer the question raised in the Dickinson dissent: why does
Dickinson's defimition of funisher not mandate social host liability?65
The most recent court-imposed limitation on liability came in 1995,
when the court held a commercial establishment not liable for injuries
sustained by an obviously intoxicated patron.' Again, the court noted its
belief that the Legislature should address issues of host liability.67 The
court reached this holding despite the fact that dangerous driving "was a
foreseeable consequence" of serving an obviously intoxicated patron,
and foreseeability is generally the boundary of negligence.68
In Washington, innocent third parties may bring suit against a vendor
who has served an intoxicated adult, but not against a social host who
has done the same. An adult who drinks and is injured thereby may not
sue either a social host or a vendor, no matter to what extent the host
may have contributed to the subsequent harm.
3. Duty when Serving Minors
The court has been far more firm with those who provide alcohol to
minors 9 than it has with those who serve obviously intoxicated adults.
Vendors not only face suit from innocent third parties,7 ° but from the
minors themselves.7 ' In addition, social hosts are potentially liable when
they serve a minor who subsequently is injured.72
in the area of social host liability was the disinclination to impose such liability. ). The court's
view on social hosts and minors is discussed infra text accompanying notes 87-97.
64. Burkhart, 110 Wash. 2d. at 385, 755 P.2d at 761.
65. Id at 398, 755 P.2d at 767 (Utter, J., concurring) ("I must now agree with Justice Durham's
statement in her dissent in Dickinson [that] ... 'the majority rationale dictates a finding of liability
for a social host.") (citation omitted).
66. See Kelly v. Falin, 127 Wash. 2d 31, 34, 896 P.2d 1245, 1246 (1995).
67. Id at 38, 896 P.2d at 1248.
68. Id at 47, 896 P.2d at 1253 (Guy, J., dissenting).
69. In Washington, it is unlawful to sell, give, or otherwise supply liquor to people under 21, or
to permit the consumption of alcohol by minors on premises under your control. Wash. Rev. Code
§ 66.44.270(1) (1996). It also is unlawful for a minor to possess, consume, or otherwise acquire
liquor. Wash. Rev. Code § 66.44.270(2Xa) (1996).
70. See Purchase v. Meyer, 108 Wash. 2d 220, 228, 737 P.2d 661, 666 (1987).
71. See Young v. Caravan Corp., 99 Wash. 2d 655,660, 663 P.2d 834, 837 (1983).
72. See Hansen v. Friend, 118 Wash. 2d 476, 482, 824 P.2d 483, 486 (1992). The distinction
between social host civil liability toward minors and immunity when dealing with adults stems in
large part from distinctions in Washington's criminal statutes. See infra notes 148-150 and
accompanying text.
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The 1983 case Young v. Caravan Corp. and the 1987 case Purchase v.
Meyer both held that violation of the statute regarding sale of alcohol
to minors amounted to negligence per se.74 The potential for liability is
limited in two ways: first, if a vendor takes "reasonable precautions" to
determine if customers are over twenty-one, negligence per se will not
be imposed as a matter of law;75 second, tort victims who violate a
statute designed for their protection, for example minors who drink, are
contributorily negligent as a matter of law.76 The question of proximate
cause and damages is left to the trier of fact.77
Young and Purchase continue to be cited by the court for the
proposition that vendor liability exists following the sale of alcohol to
minors78 despite the legislative abolition of negligence per se in most
actions.79 Additionally, the court's holdings on negligence and minors
contain other anomalies.
In the 1989 case of Christen v. Lee,"0 the court held that the sale of
alcohol to an obviously intoxicated minor, an act that violated two state
statutes,8' was not negligent per se because the minor in this case
assaulted the plaintiff. 2 The court held that in banning sales to minors
and intoxicated adults the Legislature's concern was drunk driving, not
assault.83
This reading of legislative intent is not supported by the statute itself,
which now limits negligence per se to cases involving electrical fire
safety, smoke alarms, and driving while intoxicated.84 The Legislature
thus implicitly recognized that, unencumbered, negligence per se
encompasses more risks than drunk driving. The Christen court knew
the Legislature's revised definition of negligence per se and that it was
73. 108 Wash. 2d 220,737 P.2d 661 (1987).
74. Purchase, 108 Wash. 2d at 228, 737 P.2d at 666; Young, 99 Wash. 2d at 660, 663 P.2d at
837.
75. Young, 99 Wash. 2d at 660-61, 663 P.2d at 837-38.
76. Id. at 661,663 P.2d at 838.
77. Id. at 662, 663 P.2d at 838.
78. See, e.g., Kelly v. Falin, 127 Wash. 2d 31, 37, 896 P.2d 1245, 1247 (1995).
79. Wash. Rev. Code § 5A0.050 (1996). The abolition affected all cases fil.d on or after August
1, 1986. Purchase, 108 Wash. 2d at 229, 737 P.2d at 666.
80. 113 Wash. 2d 479, 780 P.2d 1307 (1989). This case was filed before the August 1, 1986
limitation on negligence per se cases. Id at 501, 780 P.2d at 1317.
81. Wash. Rev. Code § 66.44.270 (1996) (prohibiting sale of alcohol to minor); Wash. Rev.
Code § 66.44.200 (1996) (prohibiting sale of alcohol to person obviously into:ccated).
82. Christen, 113 Wash. 2d at 501, 780 P.2d at 1318.
83. Id at 503-04, 780 P.2d at 1318-19.
84. Wash. Rev. Code § 5A0.050 (1996).
604
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not subject to the statute's limitations.85 Consequently, the court's
holding makes no sense. A physical assault is a foreseeable harm of
negligently providing someone with intoxicating liquor.86
The abolition of negligence per se has not noticeably affected the
liability standard for serving minors alcohol in Washington as seen in
the court's 1992 decision in Hansen v. Friend Hansen held that social
hosts who provide alcohol to minors may be liable to those minors if
they subsequently injure themselves.88  Washington law, while
prohibiting negligence per se in a case like this, allows a trier of fact to
consider a violation of statute as evidence of negligence.89 The court
held that, in the case of providing minors with alcohol, the statute
defined the standard of conduct "required" of a reasonable person, a
determination the court made by applying the negligence per se test."°
The only "practical effect" of the Legislature's elimination of negligence
per se, said the court, was to eliminate its "strict liability" character. The
finder of fact could determine that a statutory violation is not negligence
when the violation is due to some cause beyond the violator's control."
But the negligence per se doctrine as generally applied always allows
such a finding of excuse,9' and this had been the rule in Washington long
before the Legislature limited the doctrine. 3
85. Christen, 113 Wash. 2d at 502, 780 P.2d at 1318 (noting both statutory abolition of most
negligence per se actions and fact that case at bar was filed prior to statute's effective date).
86. See Hattie Ruttenberg, The Limited Promise of Public Health Methodologies to Prevent
Youth Violence, 103 Yale L.J. 1885, 1898 (1994) (noting "pharmacological connection... between
aggressive behavior and consumption of... alcohol"); see also Don B. Kates et al., Guns and
Public Health: Epidemic of Violence or Pandemic of Propaganda?, 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 513, 584
(1995) (noting that men who kill their domestic partners are prone to alcohol abuse); Christine
Taylor, Northern Ireland: The Policing of Domestic Violence in Nationalist Communities, 10 Wis.
Women's L.J. 307, 311 n.22 (1995) (citing 1979 Northern Ireland study that found intoxication
second most reported cause of wife battering).
87. 118 Wash. 2d 476, 824 P.2d 483 (1992).
88. Id. at 482, 824 P.2d at 486.
89. Wash. Rev. Code § 5.40.050.
90. See Hansen, 118 Wash. 2d at 480-81, 824 P.2d at 485 (quoting "negligence per se" test of
Young to determine if criminal statute defines standard of conduct "required" of reasonable
person).
91. Id at 483, 824 P.2d at 487.
92. See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts § 36, at 230 (5th ed.
1984).
93. See, e.g., Brotherton v. Day & Night Fuel Co., 192 Wash. 362, 369-70, 73 P.2d 788, 791
(1937); see also Young v. Caravan Corp., 99 Wash. 2d 655, 660-61, 663 P.2d 834, 837-38,
modified, 672 P.2d 1267 (1983) (holding that negligence per se will not apply when vendor sells
alcohol to minors if vendor takes reasonable precautions to confirm age).
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The Hansen case is also interesting for the court's treatment of
foreseeability, the traditional boundary of liability in tort cases.' In this
case, a fifteen-year old drowned after receiving liquor from two twenty-
one year old friends.9 The question of whether a minor's drowning is a
foreseeable consequence of drinking is not a question of law, but "a
question for the trier of fact."' The Hansen court relied on Christen's
language on "foreseeability,"'97 but not its holding that the only legally-
foreseeable consequence of providing alcohol to minors is drunk
driving.
4. The Journey's End
Since the repeal of the Dramshop Act, the court has journeyed from
Halvorson, where a company hosting a party cannot be liable to
innocent third parties, to Dickinson, where a company hosting a party
can be liable to innocent third parties. The court has gone from citing
Halvorson for the proposition that the common law does not recognize
any liability for suppliers of alcohol to the idea that Halvorson
established vendor duty to innocent third parties. The court established a
negligence per se duty towards minors and kept that standard after the
Legislature effectively abolished negligence per se in this context. The
court has urged that foreseeability be the touchstone of duty, yet the
court has exempted what may be the most foreseeable of all possible
outcomes-that intoxicated adults are likely to injure themselves.
In the end, the court has taken from the finder of fact its most basic
prerogative: determining whether unreasonable behavior has resulted in
a foreseeable harm, and if it has, how much of the harm resulted from
the plaintiff's contributory negligence.
94. See Keeton et a!., supra note 92, § 43, at 280; see also Christen v. Lee, 113 Wash. 2d 479,
492, 780 P.2d 1307, 1313 (1989) ("The concept of foreseeability limits the scope of the duty
owed.").
95. Hansen, 118 Wash. 2d at 478-79, 824 P.2d at 484-85.
96. Id at 484, 824 P.2d at 487.
97. Id. at 483-84, 824 P.2d at 487.
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II. THE ROAD NOT TAKEN 8
The Washington Supreme Court has split potential plaintiffs into two
groups: the "innocent" who may sue (third parties and minors) 9 and the
"guilty" who may not (intoxicated adults).'l" The court has likewise
divided possible defendants into those who may be sued by any "innocent"
plaintiff (vendors and commercial hosts)"1 and those who may not (social
hosts liable only to minors). 0 2 Because these distinctions are neither
logical nor consistent, the court should take the road to the right
destination: a uniform standard of care requiring all who furnish alcohol to
do so reasonably to avoid foreseeable harms. The confusion of the lower
courts, and the need for continuing explanation by the Washington
Supreme Court, can be eliminated by holding all alcohol furnishers to the
same standard of reasonable care that is expected in other endeavors. At
the same time there would be consistency both within the subset of civil
litigation involving alcohol and in tort law in general.0 3
To reach this point, the court will need to overcome its view of the
common law, its view of the Legislature's role, and its view of its own
role. The court also must bypass the road block it erected with its
holdings in Burkhart v. Harrod, that there is no social host duty in the
98. I shall be telling this with a sigh
Somewhere ages and ages hence:
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I-
I took the one less traveled by,
And that has made all the difference.
Robert Frost, The Road Not Taken, in The Poetry of Robert Frost 105 (Edward C. Lathem ed.,
1969).
99. See Hansen, 118 Wash. 2d at 485, 824 P.2d at 488 (finding that social hosts owe duty to
minor guests); Dickinson v. Edwards, 105 Wash. 2d 457, 466, 716 P.2d 814, 819 (1986) (holding
that commercial hosts owe duty to innocent third parties); Young v. Caravan Corp., 99 Wash. 2d
655, 660, 663 P.2d 834, 837 (1983) (holding that commercial hosts owe duty to minors they serve).
100. See Kelly v. Falin, 127 Wash. 2d 31, 34, 896 P.2d 1245, 1246 (1995) (finding commercial
establishments not liable to intoxicated adults who injure themselves).
101. See, e.g., Dickinson, 105 Wash. 2d at 466, 716 P.2d at 819.
102. See Hansen, 118 Wash. 2d at 487, 824 P.2d at 488 (finding that social hosts are liable to
minors); Burkhart v. Harrod, 110 Wash. 2d 381,383, 755 P.2d 759,760 (1988) (holding that "there
is no social host liability" in Washington).
103. Such a uniform standard of care need not abrogate all differences between commercial and
social hosts. Rather, as is customary in tort law, the finder of fact will hold the social host to that
level of care expected of social hosts, which will generally be lower than the level of care expected
of a commercial host. A jury might find a social host who failed to check a 20-year old's
identification not negligent, whereas a vendor, in an otherwise identical fact pattern, might be
negligent. See generally Keeton et al., supra note 92, § 32, at 173-74.
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state,"° and Kelly v. Falin, that there is no commercial host duty when
intoxicated adults injure themselves."' 5
A. The Court and Its Decisions
The obligation to follow precedent begins with necessity, and a
contrary necessity marks its outer limit. 106
Stare decisis is an important doctrine, though not an insurmountable
one. 7 But it is also a rule not departed from lightly. 8 It would be nice if,
as one Washington Supreme Court Justice has argued, the restriction on
social host liability did not exist."° But it does."0 Social host immunity is
the clear rule in this state, as is vendor immunity to the already
intoxicated, and both rules need to be abolished.
Although any rule may be overturned if it is incorrect and harmful,"'
the holdings on liability for furnishers of alcohol appear especially
susceptible to reconsideration. The point of the doctrine of stare decisis
is to avoid law that turns on the "whims of current holders of judicial
office."'" 2 The court's holdings in this area-companies being liable and
not liable when they host parties; furnisher being defined so as to
include social hosts, yet social hosts not being legally firmishers; and
foreseeability being a question of law, a question of fact, or a question
not even asked-has not lived up to the principle of the dcctrine."3
104. Burkhart v. Harrod, 110 Wash. 2d 381, 383, 755 P.2d 759,760 (1988).
105. Kelly v. Falin, 127 Wash. 2d 31,34, 896 P.2d 1245, 1246 (1995).
106. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).
107. See, e.g., Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940).
108. See, e.g., State ex rel. Atkinson v. Ross, 43 Wash. 290, 86 P. 575 (1906).
109. See Burkhart, 110 Wash. 2d at 391, 755 P.2d at 764 (Utter, J., concurring) (determining to
his own satisfaction that driver in this case was not "obviously intoxicated" at time he was served,
and writing that majority opinion's holding that there is no social host liability was "dicta and not
controlling").
110. See, e.g., Hansen v. Friend, 118 Wash. 2d 476, 482, 824 P.2d 483, 486 (1992) (finding it
necessary to distinguish Burkhart in order to impose liability). Justice Utt-.r signed onto this
opinion without comment. Id. at 486, 824 P.2d at 488; see also Recent Cases, Negligence-Social
Host LiabiliO-Social Hosts Not Liable for Accidents Caused by Intoxicated Guests-Burkhart v.
Harrod, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 549 (1988) [hereinafter Negligence-Social Host Liability] ("[T]he
Washington Supreme Court . .. became the latest court to reject common law social host
liability.").
111. See, e.g., Walker Creek v. Alby, 77 Wash. 2d 649, 653,466 P.2d 508, 511 (1970).
112. Id.
113. The nature of the court's holdings has not gone unnoticed by the Justic-'s themselves. See,
e.g., Kelly v. Falin, 127 Wash. 2d 31, 45, 896 P.2d 1245, 1252 (1995) ("If the majority means what
it says [no vendor liability to those who drink], both Christen and Dickinson were wrongly
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B. The Washington Supreme Court and the Washington State
Legislature
That American courts make law is no longer a debatable
proposition.!14
Since Halvorson, its first decision on the subject, the Washington
Supreme Court has recognized that changes in society wrought by the
automobile might well require increased liability for those who furnish
alcohol."' In decision after decision the court has acknowledged the
possible need for increased host liability and in decision after decision
they have deferred action to the Legislature." 6
This seeming fidelity to the concept of deference to legislative intent
appears stunning in light of the court's treatment of the Legislature's
repeal of negligence per se," 7 and would likely come as a surprise to the
members of the legislative class of 1975, who were the victims of what
has been described as "the classic example of a court circumventing
remedial tort legislation.""' In 1974 in Helling v. Carey,"9 the court
rejected a defense of standard of the profession, and held that the court
and not the ophthalmology profession would determine whether
glaucoma tests should be given to persons under forty. 20 In 1975 the
Legislature responded by requiring that plaintiffs in civil actions against
medical practitioners prove that defendants failed to exercise the skill
possessed by other persons in the same profession.12'
In the 1979 case of Gates v. Jensen," the court, offering a "patently
non-cooperative interpretation of the . . . statute, ' 3 keyed in on the
decided.") (Guy, J., dissenting); Hansen, 118 Wash. 2d at 487, 824 P.2d at 489 ("This is an odd
way to maintain continuity in the law and surely does little to engender respect .... [Gliven the
action of the court today, I do not believe it can any longer, with integrity, maintain its previous
position [of no social host liability].") (Dolliver, J., dissenting).
114. Cornelius J. Peck, Comments on Judicial Creativity, 69 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 1 (1983).
115. Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler, 76 Wash. 2d 759, 765,458 P.2d 897, 900 (1969).
116. See, e.g., Kelly, 127 Wash. 2d at 38, 896 P.2d at 1248; Burkhart v. Harrod, 110 Wash. 2d
381, 384-85, 755 P.2d 759, 760-61 (1988); Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wash. 2d 434, 441-42, 656
P.2d 1030, 1034 (1982); Halvorson, 76 Wash. 2d at 765,458 P.2d at 900.
117. See supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
118. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products
Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 479, 488 n.46 (1990).
119. 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974).
120. Id. at 519, 519 P.2d at 983.
121. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 4.24.290 (West 1988 & Supp. 1996).
122. 92 Wash. 2d 246, 595 P.2d 919 (1979).
123. Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 118, at 488 nA6.
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word "possessed," which had been changed during the legislative
process from "practiced," and held that the new law clearly "allows
ample scope for the... Helling rule."'' 4 This difference between the
Legislature's clear intent and the court's interpretation of it has been
noted by numerous commentators.125
The seeming contradiction between the court's holdings on the
standard of care for optometrists as opposed to its holdings regarding
providers of alcohol is a microcosm of a battle over tort reform, a battle
that often comes down to a debate over when a court must act to fulfill
its common law obligations, and when it must wait for legislative
mandate.
26
On one side is the argument that judge-made law is fundamentally
antidemocratic.' 7 On the other side is the contention that legislatures
have "no stomach" for tort reform." 8 In fact, the conflict is an illusion
and the process is in no way undemocratic.' Courts and legislatures
interact, the former taking on politically unappealing or uninteresting
reforms that the latter shun, with legislatures retaining the right to
change a court's holdings. 30 Courts then may be active in some areas,
124. Gates, 92 Wash. 2d at 254, 595 P.2d at 924.
125. See Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 118, at 488 n.46; see also Neil K. Komesar,
Injuries and Institutions: Tort Reform, Tort Theory, and Beyond, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 23, 77 n.122
(1990); Cornelius J. Peck, Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage: Understanding the Development of
the Law of Wrongful Discharge, 66 Wash. L. Rev. 719, 754 n.186 (1991); Walter Probert, The
Politics of Torts Casebooks: Jurisprudence Reductus, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 1233, 1242 n.56 (1991);
Ellen Wertheimer, Unknowable Dangers and the Death of Strict Products L;ability: The Empire
Strikes Back, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1183, 1269 n.346 (1992); Susan Cowan Atkinson, Note, Medicare
"Cost Containment" and Home Health Care: Potential Liability for Physicians and Hospitals, 21
Ga. L. Rev. 901, 915 n.77 (1987); Stanton Phillip Beck, Comment, Enhanced Injury: A Direction
for Washington, 61 Wash. L. Rev. 571, 574 n.19 (1986); Bruce L. Schroeder, Comment,
Washington's Useful Safe Life: Snipping Off the Long Tail of Products Liability?, 57 Wash. L.
Rev. 503, 518 n.97 (1982).
126. See generally Cornelius J. Peck, The Role of the Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of
Tort Law, 48 Minn. L. Rev. 265, 267 (1964).
127. See generally Luke K. Cooperrider, A Comment on the Law of Tort., 56 Mich. L. Rev.
1291, 1308-09 (1958).
128. Thomas A. Cowan, Rule or Standard in Tort Law, 13 Rutgers L. Rev. 141, 159 (1958); see
also Peck, supra note 126, at 268.
129. See generally Robert N. Clinton, Judges Must Make Law: A Realis'ic Appraisal of the
Judicial Function in a Democratic Society, 67 Iowa L. Rev. 711, 718-19 (1982) ("[Jjudicial
lawmaking through statutory interpretation arises out of the necessity to determine the applicable
law in the absence of clear direction from the democratically-elected legislative body.").
130. Peck, supra note 114, at 45.
610
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deferential in others.' The proper question is when should a court act?
The answer is when the Legislature, for reasons of political reality such
as resistance from large parts of the population, does not.'32 This is the
case with social host liability.
133
The court is aware of this argument in favor of judicial activism, but
has indicated that it is relevant only when the Legislature has been lax.
34
The court added that the Legislature has been highly active in the area of
drunk driving, and noted a flurry of legislative action.'35
This argument is unpersuasive as it relies upon a characterization of
legislative action that fails for two reasons. First, as the court itself has
acknowledged, although it is a "characteristic" of drunk driving statutes
that they are "continually being changed by the Legislature," the overall
rules and regulations remain the same. 1
36
Second, and more important, the issue is not drunk driving: it is
furnishing alcohol to people who subsequently drive drunk. There is no
question that drunk drivers are liable to those they injure. 137 In fact,
drunk drivers are one of the few classes of tortfeasors who are negligent
per se.'38 In the area of negligent alcohol provision, the Legislature has
been at a near standstill. The law on selling liquor to the obviously
intoxicated has not changed since its inception in 1933."9 Although the
law on furnishing liquor to minors was rewritten in 1987 and modified
in 1993, the basic premise, that only parents, guardians, and medical
professionals may provide minors with alcohol, has been consistent
since 1955."4 Determining the duty owed by those who furnish alcohol
is exactly the type of area where the court must act in the face of
legislative inaction. 1
4
'
131. For example, the Washington Supreme Court has defened to the Legislature on the
question of social host liability and been proactive in the area of medical standards of care. See
supra text accompanying notes 118-125.
132. See generally Peck, supra note 114, at 8-9, 45.
133. See Burkhart v. Harrod, 110 Wash. 2d 381, 387, 755 P.2d 759, 761 (1988) ("[S]ocial host
liability would touch most adults in the state on a frequent basis.").
134. Icd at 389, 755 P.2d at 763.
135. IR
136. See Purchase v. Meyer, 108 Wash. 2d 220,223 n.1, 737 P.2d 661, 663 n.1 (1987).
137. Id at 224, 737 P.2d at 663.
138. Wash. Rev. Code § 5.40.050 (1996).
139. Wash. Rev. Code § 66.44.200 (1996).
140. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 66.44.270 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997).
141. See Burkhart v. Harod, 110 Wash. 2d, 381, 400, 755 P.2d 759, 768 (1988) (Utter, J.,
concurring) ("The majority would be correct in deferring to the Legislature if the Legislature had in
fact spoken.").
Washington Law Review
The court has relied not only on legislative inaction, but on tangential
actions that they read as indicative of the Legislature's intent. For
example, the court said that repeal of the Dramshop Act showed a
disapproval on the part of the Legislature for social host liability.'42 But
does it? "When the Legislature seeks to destroy a common law right of
action, it generally does so explicitly."' 43 Yet the legislative history does
not support the court's extensive reading. The published records of the
House contain only two notations that "debate [on the repeal] ensued."'"
The Senate history also contains no debate on the merits.145 The court's
finding that the repeal of the Dramshop Act is support for a finding of
legislative disapproval of social host liability is highly presumptive."4
Prior to the Dramshop Act's repeal the court never held the Act
applicable to social hosts.'47 As the court had not construed the Act to
give a right against social hosts, how could its repeal show disapproval
of such a right?
To explain why both commercial and social hosts can be liable for
furnishing alcohol to minors, whereas only commercial hosts must
refrain from serving the obviously intoxicated, the court has relied upon
the fact that it is a criminal act to sell or give alcohol to a minor, 48 while
it is only illegal to sell alcohol to an intoxicated adult.'49 This grafting of
criminal liability onto a civil action ignores a basic rule of law: A tort is
not the same thing as a crime.5 '
And, when a vendor violates the law by selling to a person obviously
intoxicated, the court has held that the vendor has no liability to that
142. Id. at 387-88, 755 P.2d at 762.
143. Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 76 Wash. 2d 759, 766, 458 P.2d 897, 901 (1969)
(Finley, J., dissenting).
144. Wash. House J. at 786 (1955).
145. Wash. Senate J. at 892-94 (1955).
146. See Halvorson, 76 Wash. 2d at 766, 458 P.2d at 901 (Finley, J., dissenting) ("In my
opinion, the majority has drawn extremely dubious conclusions ... from a most insubstantial
legislative history.").
147. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
148. Hansen v. Friend, 118 Wash. 2d 476, 482, 824 P.2d 483, 486 (1992 (citing Wash. Rev.
Code § 66.44.270(l)).
149. Burkhart v. Harrod, 110 Wash. 2d 381, 388, 755 P.2d 759, 762 (1988) (citing Wash. Rev.
Code § 66.44.200).
150. Keeton et al., supra note 92, § 2, at 7 (1984) ("The civil action for a tort... is commenced
and maintained by the injured person, and its primary purpose is to compensate for the damage
suffered at the expense of the wrongdoer."); see also Leon Green, Judge and Jury 224 (1930)
("Nothing is clearer than that these factors [that direct and control judicial dreisions] differ from
case to case ... and vary even more from torts to crimes. There are frequently difficulties of
administration on the criminal side.., where there are none on the civil side, or visa versa.").
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intoxicated person."' Not because of anything in the statute itself, but
because it "belies common sense" to suggest that the law intended to
shield drunk drivers from responsibility for their own actions.'52 The
court found that the statute was passed to protect the welfare and safety
of the people of the state,'53 but the court also asked the injured patron to
offer evidence that the Legislature intended the act to protect "the drunk
driver."'54 This request appears to be in direct conflict with the court's
earlier holding that the Liquor Control Act "is to be liberally construed,
to the end that its purposes may be accomplished."' 55 If the purpose of
the Act is to protect the people of the state, it can best be effectuated by
providing the maximum disincentives to vendors who might negligently
serve the obviously intoxicated. A liberal construction should also
include those who drink within the class of people protected by the
statute.
In addition to not indicating disapproval of social host liability, the
Legislature has conveyed support for the right of intoxicated adults to
sue vendors and social hosts who serve them negligently, as shown by
the enactment of Washington Revised Code section 5.40.060 in 1986.156
Section 5.40.060 provides a complete defense for any personal injury or
wrongful death action if the victim was (1) under the influence of
intoxicating liquor, and that this condition was a proximate cause of
injury or death, and (2) the trier of fact finds such person to have been
more than fifty percent at fault.'57 The standard Washington contributory
fault statute has no such complete defense provision.'58
By both allowing for a defense and placing a limitation on that
defense in the hands of the jury, the Legislature clearly indicated a
preference for permitting causes of action to go forward where a
reasonable jury could find that intoxicated victims were not more than
half responsible for their fates.'59 There is nothing in the statute to
indicate any limitation on an inebriated person's right of action other
than the clear requirement of falling at or below the fifty percent fault
151. See Kelly v. Falin, 127 Wash. 2d 31,37, 896 P.2d 1245, 1248 (1995).
152. Id at 39, 896 P.2d at 1249.
153. Id. (citing Wash. Rev. Code § 66.08.010).
154. Id
155. State ex rel. Tollefson v. Novak, 7 Wash. 2d 544,554, 110 P.2d 636, 640 (1941).
156. Act of Apr. 4, 1986, ch. 305, 1986 Wash. Laws 902.
157. Wash. Rev. Code § 5A0.060 (1996).
158. Wash. Rev. Code § 4.22.005 (1996).
159. See generally Kelly, 127 Wash. 2d at 48-49, 896 P.2d at 1253-54 (Guy, J., dissenting).
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mark. "In interpreting a statute, the court should assume that the
Legislature meant exactly what it said."'"
Certainly the Legislature in 1986, before the Washington Supreme
Court placed its own limitations on rights of action by intoxicated
persons who injure themselves, could have placed an additional
limitation in this section had they wanted to. In the absence of such an
additional limitation the canon of construction of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, recognized by the Washington Court,'' should apply:
"[W]here a form of conduct, the manner of its performance and
operation, and the persons and things to which it refers are designated,
there is an inference that all omissions should be understood as
exclusions."'62
In the field of tort law, courts, including the courts of Washington, 63
have overwhelmingly been the maker of the law."6 Although statutes
influence this development, 65 the court, as the guarantor of
constitutional rights, may even overturn a statute where the Legislature
has denied a right of action for recognized wrongful conduct."6
The limitations that the court has placed on the liability of those who
negligently furnish alcohol are not explicit, nor even implicit, in the acts
of the Legislature. If anything, the Legislature has indicated that, in the
case of intoxicated people who injure themselves, a right of action
should exist. At the same time, the traditional role of the court argues for
activism in this field of tort law.
C. The Court and Society
A timid judge, like a biased judge, is intrinsically a lawless
judge.16
7
160. Geschwind v. Flanagan, 121 Wash. 2d 833, 841, 854 P.2d 1061, 1065 (1993).
161. Specific inclusions exclude implication. See State v. Sommerville, 111 Wash. 2d 524, 535,
760 P.2d 932, 938 (1988).
162. 2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47.23 (5th ed. 1992).
163. See Burkhart v. Harrod, 110 Wash. 2d 381, 394, 755 P.2d 759, 765 (1988) (Utter, J.,
concurring).
164. Keeton et al., supra note 92, § 3, at 19.
165. Id.
166. Peck, supra note 2, at 683 (arguing that some tort actions come within rights of due process
clause of 14th Amendment of U.S. Constitution and article I, section 3 of Washington
Constitution).
167. Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 65 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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As the court has noted, a strong argument can be made for social host
liability and against it.1 ' In fact, numerous comments have been written
on the subject, both pro and con. 69 In declining to decide this issue, the
court has described the debate as one of "competing social interests" best
left to the Legislature. 70 Similarly, the subject of liability when an
intoxicated person is injured, has been the subject of its own field of legal
scholarship, albeit a smaller expanse. 7 ' Again, the court has held that the
Legislature should determine accountability. 72
But to not decide is to decide. To not find a class subject to potential
liability is to find that class immune from suit, as is the case with social
hosts who serve intoxicated adults. To find that a group requires specific
legislative mandate to be within the protection of the law is to find that
group outside the realm of the law, as is the case with intoxicated adults
who injure themselves.
1. Social Host Liability
Once the court accepted that commercial hosts have a duty to
innocent third parties, 73 it abrogated the traditional common law
analysis that drinking alcohol, not furnishing it, is the proximate cause
of any resulting injury.174 Today, negligently furnishing alcohol may be
168. See Burkhart, 110 Wash. 2d at 384, 755 P.2d at 760.
169. See, e.g., Randall 0. Sorrels & Benny Agosto, Jr., Social Host Liability: Friends Can Let
Friends Drive Drunk!, 32 Houston Law. 46, 48 (1994) (stating that social host liability is "sound
public policy"); Ashmead, supra note 19, at 997 (arguing against social host liability); Robert W.
Gomulkiewicz, Comment, Recognizing the Liability of Social Hosts Who Knowingly Allow
Intoxicated Guests to Drive: Limits to Socially Acceptable Behavior, 60 Wash. L. Rev. 389, 406
(1985) (arguing that Washington courts should recognize liability of negligent social hosts); Mary
H. Seminara, Note, When the Party's Over, 68 B.U. L. Rev. 193, 214 (1988) (arguing for liability
for reckless social hosts); Negligence-Social Host Liability, supra note 110, at 549 (noting general
trend among commentators in favor of social host liability).
170. Burkhart, 110 Wash. 2d at 385, 755 P.2d at 761.
171. See, e.g., Madeleine E. Kelly, Liquor Liability andBlame-Shifting Defenses: Do they Mix?,
69 Marq. L. Rev. 217, 232 (1986) (stating that interpreting liquor control laws to allow intoxicated
adults rights of action is "more reasoned view"); Catherine Fancher, Comment, One Too Many?,
25 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 239, 252-53 (1993) (noting right to action for intoxicated individuals is both
proper under Texas statute and Texas common law); Julia A. Harden, Comment, Dramshop
Liability: Should the Intoxicated Person Recover for His Own Injuries?, 48 Ohio St. L.J. 227, 245
(1987) (arguing that comparative negligence framework properly allocates burden between tavern
and intoxicated person).
172. See Kelly v. Falin, 127 Wash. 2d 31, 38, 896 P.2d 1245, 1248 (1995).
173. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 3.
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a proximate cause of resulting harms.175 From this doctrine and from the
court's definition of "furnishing" as controlling a guest's access to
alcohol,'76 comes the logical conclusion that social hosts should have
potential liability.1 77 Currently, they do not.
178
The basis for the court's holding on social host immunity is that such
an issue of "public policy usually is declared by the Legislature, and not
by the courts.' 79 Yet, in other contexts, the court has aclmowledged that
it makes the "policy decision" of determining whert legal liability
exists.' Duty and legal causation are also policy decisions of the
court.
18 1
The court also offers what are policy justifications for its decision not
to impose social host liability. Social hosts are not as capable of
handling the responsibility of knowing when a guest has had too much
to drink,'82 and it would raise too many 'problematic questions" for
them.'83 Furthermore, social hosts are a numerous population, whose
response to a court-imposed duty cannot be predicted.'
The court's fear that social hosts will be unable to know when to say
no is unfounded. Determining that social hosts owe a duty when
unreasonable behavior results in foreseeable harm is merely an
application of standard tort doctrine. 5 The very fact that the majority of
adults in this state do have experience as social hosts' will mean that
juries, and most if not all judges, will be better able to determine when a
social host's furnishing of alcohol is unreasonable.
175. See Dickinson v. Edwards, 105 Wash. 2d 457,461,716 P.2d 814, 816 (1986).
176. Id at466, 716 P.2d at 819.
177. See Burkhart v. Harrod, 110 Wash. 2d 381, 398, 755 P.2d 759, 767 (1988) (Utter, J.,
concurring) ("There is no logical reason to deny recovery to victims injured as a proximate result
of equally unreasonable actions by social hosts.").
178. Id. at 383, 755 P.2d at 760.
179. IM. at 385, 755 P.2d at 761.
180. Habeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460,476, 656 P.2d 483,493 (1983).
181. See, e.g., Hartley v. State, 103 Wash. 2d 768, 779, 698 P.2d 77, 83 (1985).
182. Burkhart, 110 Wash. 2d at 387, 755 P.2d at 761.
183. Id. at 384, 755 P.2d at 760.
184. Id. at 387, 755 P.2d at 761.
185. See Keeton et al., supra note 92, § 43, at 280 ("If one could not reasonably foresee any
injury as the result of one's act... there would be no negligence, and no liability."); see also
Ochampaugh v. City of Seattle, 91 Wash. 2d 514, 519, 588 P.2d 1351, 1354 (1979) (quoting
Restatement of Torts regarding "ordinary negligence basis of a duty of reasonable care not to inflict
foreseeable harm").
186. See Burkhart, 110 Wash. 2d at 387, 755 P.2d at 761.
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2. The Self-Inflicted Injury
By denying rights of action to the intoxicated who injure themselves,
the court has decided that duty varies by the victim, 187 a finding in direct
conflict with earlier Washington case law' and the will of the
Legislature. 89 In Kelly v. Falin, the court took from the jury the right to
determine comparative negligence, and avoided the issue of
foreseeability, by finding that there was no duty owed to intoxicated
patrons. 190 Duty, however, is bound up with foreseeability, and actors are
responsible for the foreseeable consequences of their acts.' 9' In Christen
v. Lee the court took from the jury the right to determine whether a harm
was foreseeable by holding that, as a matter of law, a violent assault
would not foreseeably arise from serving drinks to a minor absent a
specific reason to anticipate violence. 92 Yet, violence can be a
foreseeable outcome of drunkenness even absent the specificity the court
requires.' 93
The result of the court's decisions is to limit severely the traditional
role of the finder of fact, which is to determine negligence.' 4 In truth it
187. See Kelly v. Falin, 127 Wash. 2d 31, 43, 896 P.2d 1245, 1250 (1995) (Guy, J., dissenting).
188. See Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wash. 2d 434, 439, 656 P.2d 1030, 1033 (1982) (stating that
argument in favor of having duty vary by identity of victim is "wholly unpersuasive"); Mutual of
Enumclaw Ins. v. Wiscomb, 97 Wash. 2d 203, 209, 643 P.2d 441, 444 (1982) (holding that
insurance policies cannot exclude class of innocent victims); see also Kelly, 127 Wash. 2d at 46,
896 P.2d at 1252 (Guy, J., dissenting) ("Tort duties must not vary by the identity of the injured
party.").
189. See supra notes 157-162 and accompanying text.
190. Kelly, 127 Wash. 2d at 42, 896 P.2d at 1250.
191. Burkhart, 110 Wash. 2d at 395, 755 P.2d at 766 (Utter, J., concurring); see also Wells v.
Vancouver, 77 Wash. 2d 800, 802, 467 P.2d 292, 295 (1970) ("IT]he duty to use ordinary care is
bounded by the foreseeable range of danger. It is for the jury to decide whether a general field of
danger should have been anticipated.").
192 Christen v. Lee, 113 Wash. 2d 479, 503-04,780 P.2d 1307, 1319 (1989).
193. See supra note 86; see also Christen, 113 Wash. 2d at 512, 780 P.2d at 1323 (Utter, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (finding majority's reasons for limiting jury decision on
foreseeability "unpersuasive").
194. See, e.g., Bodin v. City of Stanwood, 130 Wash. 2d 726, 741, 927 P.2d 240, 248 (1996)
("Negligence is generally a question of fact for the jury, and should be decided as a matter of law
only 'in the clearest of cases and when reasonable minds could not have differed in their
interpretation' of the facts.") (citations omitted); Kelly, 127 Wash. 2d at 43, 896 P.2d at 1250 (Guy,
J., dissenting) ("[A] jury, not this court, should decide ... comparative fault."); Burkhart, 110
Wash. 2d at 395, 755 P.2d at 766 (Utter, J., concurring) ("[Naturally, it is for the finder of fact to
determine if the host [has breached a duty]."); Bemethy v. Walt Failor's, Inc., 97 Wash. 2d 929,
933, 653 P.2d 280, 282 (1982) ("[I]n deciding questions of duty we evaluate public policy
consideratios... the jury's function is to decide the foreseeable range of danger ..."); McLeod
v. Grant County Sch. Dist., 42 Wash. 2d 316, 324, 255 P.2d 360, 365 (1953) ("We have held that it
Washington Law Review
seems the Washington Supreme Court has increased its policy-making
role at the expense of the traditional deference due to the finder of
fact. 195
By denying rights of action to those injured due to negligence on the
part of those who furnish alcohol, because of who the plaintiff is (the
intoxicated person), or who the defendant is (a social host), the court is
taking on the very mantle of judicial legislator that it so strongly decries.
The general rule in Washington is that all people are liable for the
foreseeable consequences of their unreasonable behavior.1" Although
there are times when a court must act, the court's holdings, which
immunize the large class of social hosts197 and stigmatize drunk drivers,
are the antithesis of the principle that the primary time for court activism
is when politically unpopular decisions are needed.198
In refusing to afford a right of action to an intoxicated adult or, in the
case of social hosts, all but the minors they serve, the court places great
reliance on the fact that its restrictions on liability are the same as those
of a majority of other states.199 But this "everybody-else-is-doing-it"
reasoning is insufficient to support the court's making poor policy and
ignoring established legal principles. If the Legislature seeks to limit
liability, as long as it does not violate due process, 2  it may.
By eliminating these two court-drawn restrictions on furnisher
liability, the court will provide consistency both within the area of
intoxicating liquors and within overall tort doctrine in 'Washington. By
returning to the finder of fact the question of fault, reasonable behavior,
foreseeability, and contributory negligence, the court will better
effectuate both its own traditions and legislative intent. By developing
is for the jury to decide [forseeability].'); see also Keeton et al., supra note 92, § 37, at 238 (stating
that when reasonable persons may differ as to conclusion to be drawn, issue must be left to jury).
195. See Schooley v. Pinch's Deli Mkt., Inc., 80 Wash. App. 862, 871, 912 P.2d 1044, 1049
(finding that Kelly has established that protected class is defined not by foreseeability alone, but
according to social policy), review granted, 129 Wash. 2d 1025, 922 P.2d 98 (1996)
196. See supra note 185; see also Burkhart, 110 Wash. 2d at 398, 755 P.2d at 767 (Utter, J.,
concurring).
197. See Burkhart, 110 Wash. 2d at 387, 755 P.2d at 761.
198. See supra notes 127-133 and accompanying text.
199. See Kelly, 127 Wash. 2d at 42, 896 P.2d at 1250 (1995) (noting that majority of
jurisdictions have rejected rule that commercial vendors have duty to intoxicated patrons);
Burkhart, 110 Wash. 2d at 389 n.3, 755 P.2d at 763 n.3 (noting that most jurisdictions that have
considered question of social host liability have rejected it); see also Negligence-Social Host
Liability, supra note 110, at 552 (stating that only New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Iowa have
found common law duty of care for social hosts, and that Iowa's finding has since been
legislatively overturned).
200. See supra note 166.
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the common law of tort liability, the court will be following its
established role.
Although some may fear that this extension of liability could lead to
increased litigation, Washington law prevents any explosion by denying
a right of action to a person whose intoxication is found to be more than
fifty percent responsible for the subsequent injury.20' Washington law
also provides complete civil and criminal indemnification for vendors
who take specified precautions to insure that they are not serving
minors.202
It may be true that at one time it made sense to hold the drinker
responsible for the outcome of drinking, but "the freeway, the high-
compression gasoline engine . . . the high-speed automobile... the
social dangers resulting from the lackadaisical mixture of alcohol and
gasoline" were 'nknown to the common law.... Times change, and the
common law changes with the times . ... "
The "contrary necessity" required to overturn precedent ° clearly
exists. The court should overrule its holding in Kelly v. Falin that
intoxicated patrons who injure themselves cannot bring suit; the court
should further abolish the distinction it made in Burkhart v. Harrod and
hold social hosts liable for all negligent service of alcohol.
D. The Court and the Common Law
With the common law comes our obligation to interpret the law in
each case.0 5
1. The Solace of the Common Law
From the beginning to the end of its journey, the court has always
sought the stabilizing force of the common law in its limiting of liability.
In 1969 they quoted extensively from secondary sources and other state
courts to establish that the common law would find no liability for an
alcohol provider.2" In 1995 they again stated this "common law rule"
201. See Wash. Rev. Code § 5.40.060 (1996).
202. See Wash. Rev. Code § 66.20.210 (1996).
203. Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler, 76 Wash. 2d 759, 765, 458 P.2d 897, 900-01 (1969)
(Finley, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
204. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).
205. Kelly v. Falin, 127 Wash. 2d 31, 45, 896 P.2d 1245, 1252 (1995) (Guy, J., dissenting).
206. See Halvorson, 76 Wash. 2d. at 762,458 P.2d at 899.
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and noted their repeated refusals to go beyond the limited exceptions
they have made.2"7 This reliance on an historical formulation would
wrongly freeze the law in place. To paraphrase Justice Cardozo, such
reliance would mistake the evening's lodge for the journey's end.20 8
Although it is true that the traditional interpretation of the common
law did not recognize causes of action against a furnisher of alcohol,2°9
the court has seen fit to move beyond these historical limitations.
Liability for commercial vendors first came into being in 1959.210 And it
was the Washington court in Hansen that became the first to use an
evidence of negligence test in absence of either negligence per se or a
civil action law to find social host liability.
211
The court has already gone a long way toward dismantling the
historic vestiges of the common law rule, 12 and it need only follow the
road to the proper end. The Washington Supreme Court has shown time
and again that it is a major source of rights in tort.213 And the rights it
now should insure are those of all who are injured as the result of
negligently furnishing alcohol, no matter who has provided the liquor,
no matter if they are the person who drank the drink.
2. A Common Law Source ofLiability
Even as historically interpreted, the common law did not deprive all
injured parties of a right of recovery against a funisher of alcohol.2 4 It
recognized that liability might ensue if a person had lost all will
power,215 or if liquor had been sold to a known alcoholic.
216
207. See Kelly, 127 Wash. 2d at 36-37, 896 P.2d at 1247-48.
208. See Cardozo, supra note 1.
209. See supra note 3.
210. See Seminara, supra note 169, at 194 (citing Rappaport v. Nichols, 156 A.2d 1 (N.J.
1959)).
211. See Laura Hoexter, Note, A Minor Hazard: Social Host Liability in Washington After
Hansen v. Friend, 68 Wash. L. Rev. 227, 236 n.85 (1993).
212. See Kelly, 127 Wash. 2d at 37, 896 P.2d at 1248.
213. See, e.g., Ueland v. Pengo Hydra-Pull Corp., 103 Wash. 2d 131, 691 P.2d 190 (1984)
(recognizing right of children to recover for loss of parental consortium); Martin v. Abbot Labs.,
102 Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984) (adopting market share alternate liability theory); Habeson
v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983) (recognizing rights of action for
wrongful birth and wrongful life); Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wash. 2d 735, 565
P.2d 1173 (1977) (recognizing right to recover for harm caused by outrageoLs behavior); Mazetti
v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1913) (imposing strict liability without privity of
contact for defective food and drink).
214. See Shelby v. Keck, 85 Wash. 2d 911,917, 541 P.2d 365, 370 (1975).
215. 45 Am. Jur. 2dlntoxicatingLiquors § 553 (1969).
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The solution to the question of adherence to the "common law' is
provided within those documents that were created to insure a certainty
of law genuine, broad, and just: the Restatements." ' Section 390 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts states a common law source of duty that
includes all people and gives protection to all those harmed by a
violation of that duty. Supplying a chattel, by sale or gift, to people who
are likely to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk to themselves
or others, makes the supplier subject to liability for resulting physical
harm."' The court has adopted section 390 as the summation of the duty
owed by the people of Washington.21 9 As far back as 1922 the court
recognized that automobile owners could be liable for loaning their cars
to one known to be reckless or incompetent." ° Allowing a driver one has
put in such a reckless or incompetent condition to get into that driver's
own vehicle is just as negligent.
In illustrating section 390, the Restatement offers the example of
someone who rents a boat to obviously intoxicated people: the lessor is
liable to them and anyone they injure. 2" As the Washington Supreme
Court has noted, the kinds of actions forbidden by section 390 are set
forth in its illustrations.m There is a clear common law duty upon all
who furnish alcohol, a duty that extends to those who drink the liquor
and any innocent third parties they may injure.'m
III. WHY THIS DESTINATION?
Under the guise of judicial restraint, the court has exempted social
hosts, a significant class of potential defendants, from liability; 4 the
court has denied intoxicated adults, a significant class of plaintiffs, a
216. See Halvorson, 76 Wash. 2d at 767, 458 P.2d at 901 (Finley, J., dissenting).
217. See Cardozo, supra note 1, at 17.
218. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390 (1965).
219. See Bemethy v. Walt Failor's Inc., 97 Wash. 2d 929, 933, 653 P.2d 280, 283 (1982) ("In
weighing the policy considerations, we hold that the duty owed by respondent [who sold a gun to
an intoxicated man] is best summarized by Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390 (1965) which we
now adopt.").
220. See Jones v. Harris, 122 Wash. 69, 74, 210 P. 22, 24 (1922).
221. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390 illus. 7.
222. See Mele v. Turner, 106 Wash. 2d 73, 77, 720 P.2d 787, 789 (1986).
223. For a more detailed look at section 390 in the commercial setting, see generally Robert M.
Howard, Note, The Negligent Commercial Transaction Tort: Imposing Common Law Liability on
Merchants for Sales and Leases to "Defective" Customers, 1988 Duke L.J. 755.
224. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
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right of action." The court relies on the traditional view of the common
law, but the court has already moved beyond that view. The court relies
on legislative inaction, but when the Legislature is not protecting rights
is exactly the moment when a court must act. The court alternatively
relies on what actions the Legislature has taken, even though the court is
actually countering the will of the Legislature. The court has also
seriously diminished, in some cases eliminated, the fact finder's role in
determining comparative negligence and foreseeabliy. What really
seems to be happening is nothing less than an old fashioned negative
attitude towards drinkers, as can be seen in the court's opinions.n6
There is certainly a sense in the Kelly decision that intoxicated adults
are to be denied recovery as punishment for their sins. 7 Such a concept
is the essence of the contributory negligence bar to recovery"8 that has
been replaced by a comparative negligence system in Washington. 9
The reason for the existence of comparative negligence is to counteract
the hardship engendered by the doctrine of contributory n, gligence. 0
In one sense, the court is adhering to one of the oldest traditions in
this area of the law: the drinker is at fault." But, as discussed above,
this is a doctrine that the court has in many cases abandoned. 2 This
abandonment is a logical step both because of what we now know about
alcoholism, 3 and because as people drink their abilities decrease, and
the furnisher's duty obviously should increase."
225. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
226. See, e.g., Kelly v. Falin, 127 Wash. 2d 31, 41, 896 P.2d 1245, 1250 (1995) ("A rule that
allows an intoxicated adult to hold a commercial vendor liable fosters irresponsibility and rewards
drunk driving."); Dickinson v. Edwards, 105 Wash. 2d, 457, 499, 716 P.2d 814, 836 (Durham, J.,
dissenting) ("I do not believe we should sacrifice the concept of individual responsibility as part of
a crusade against furnishers of alcohol.").
227. See Kelly, 127 Wash. 2d at 41, 896 P.2d at 1250.
228. See Keeton et al., supra note 92, § 65, at 452; see also 45 Am. Jur. 2d Intoxicating Liquors
§ 554 (1969) (stating that denial of recovery to consumers of alcohol is lased on decedent's
contributory negligence).
229. Wash. Rev. Code § 4.22.005 (1996).
230. See Keeton et al., supra note 92, § 67, at 468.
231. See supra note 3.
232. See supra notes 173-175 and accompanying text.
233. See Judith A. Goldberg, Note, Due Process Limitations on Involuntary Commitment of
Individuals Who Abuse Drugs or Alcohol, 75 B.U. L. Rev. 1481, 1482 (1995) ("The American
Psychiatric Association includes alcoholism... [among the] subsets of the psychiatric disorder
'substance abuse."'); see also In re William A. Noble, 100 Wash. 2d 88, 92, 667 P.2d 608, 611
(1983) (recognizing "disease" of alcoholism can be mitigating factor in attorney disciplinary
hearing); Phillips v. City of Seattle, 51 Wash. App. 415, 420 n.2, 754 P.2d 116, 118 n.2 (1988)
("We recognize that the disease of alcoholism is permanent...."), aff'd, 111 Wash. 2d 903, 766
P.2d 1099 (1989). But see Traynor v. Tumage, 485 U.S. 535, 550 (1988) (discussing district
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IV. CONCLUSION
In abrogating the traditional common law rule that drinking alcohol
and not furnishing it is the proximate cause of any harms caused by the
drinker, the Washington Supreme Court has recognized that it is
possible to furnish alcohol in a manner legally negligent. But by placing
strict limits on both the class of potential plaintiffs, which can never
include intoxicated adults who injure themselves, and the potential
defendants, which can never include social hosts unless they have
provided alcohol to a minor, the court has drawn an improper
distinction. The court's grafting of a legal duty onto a civil action has
blurred the distinction between tort and crime. By abdicating its policy
making role, the court has made poor policy. In not acting, the court has
acted.
The issue of whether a plaintiffs harm is self-inflicted is one of
contributory negligence; the question of whether a defendant acted in an
manner unreasonable under the circumstances is one of foreseeability.
Both of these are properly left to the trier of fact.
court's "accurate" characterization of "'a substantial body of medical literature that even contests
the proposition that alcoholism is a disease') (citations omitted).
234. See Kelly v. Falin, 127 Wash. 2d 31, 47-48, 896 P.2d 1245, 1252 (1995) (Guy, J.,
dissenting) (stating that once person is intoxicated it is furnisher who makes decision on another
drink); see also Kelly, supra note 171, at 232 (explaining that protection of liability rights of
intoxicated persons is "the more reasoned view.. .[showing] recognition of the commonly-known
fact that intoxicated adults... are not fully able to exercise reasonable care").

